[Seminaire CREM] Présentation de Jean-Christophe PEREAU, Université de Bordeaux
Negotiating Emission Reduction Agreements: Alone or in a Pool?
Giovedì 5 febbraio 2026, 12:15
Abstract:
We analyze the case of a country called the negotiator which engages simultaneous and bilateral negotiations with countries over emission reductions in exchange of transfers. Countries have the choice to bargain alone or in a pool with the negotiator. Our results show that depending on the shape (concave or convex) of the benefit and cost function, the type of beliefs (symmetric or passive) in case of disagreement and the timing of the negotiation (simultaneous or Stackelberg), several configurations in terms of abatement efforts and size of stable pool can emerge. Our analysis highlights that the role of the negotiator as an agenda setter might enhance cooperation in abatement efforts.
co-écrit avec Noemí Navarro
